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1.  Introduction 
 
Erythropoietin (EPO) is a recombinant protein that stimulates the production of blood red 
cells; it is used for the treatment of anemia related to chronic renal failure in dialysis 
patients, to increase the production of autologous blood in normal subjects, and to reduce 
the duration of anemia in patients treated with chemotherapy. Dispensing of EPO 
represents a strong advance in such therapies, also because it reduces the need of blood 
transfusions, with less risks of coming down with illnesses like viral hepatitis and AIDS. 
The biotech drug market is very competitive. In recent years, biotech has claimed 
an increasing share of novel treatments approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA); that trend is shifting (Lawrence, 2004). There are more new drugs 
or biologic applications coming from biotechnologies. The number of biotech drugs on 
the market that have sales over 1 billion USD per year is rapidly increasing. Recombinant 
therapeutic proteins still represent the main business sector of biotechnological drugs. 
Their development started in the ‘80s with the beginning of a lot of clinical studies and 
the launch of the first products. Recent estimations showed a market in constant growth, 
with worldwide sales of 32 billion USD in 2003, and expected sales of about 53 billion in 
2010 (Pavlou and Reichert, 2004).  
In this paper we study the demand and supply of erythropoietin in four Nordic 
countries, using an econometric model based on discrete choice and a random utility 
model. It measures the effect of price changes as well as the loyalty of patients and 
physicians to a drug. Our main aims are to estimate demand for EPO and to determine the 
degree of competition in this Nordic market. The main motivation for this paper is to 
analyze the impact of product innovation on market power and welfare, e.g. on consumer 
and producer surplus. The product innovation is the entry of Aranesp in the Nordic 
market. 
We find a positive effect related to the introduction of a strong product innovation 
in the EPO market. The large increase in consumer surplus however seems not to be 
accompanied by a large increase in producer surplus, whose growth is slight. Some time 
after the introduction of the innovation, the total surplus tends to remain more or less the   3
same (or decreases a bit). Although there are only three producers in the Nordic market 
(after the entry of Aranesp), the estimated market power in the long run is rather low. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections we give a brief review 
of literature and a description of the different EPO product and the global market. In 
Section 4 we present the econometric models and in Section 5 summary statistics of the 
sample follows. Estimates are given in Section 6 while Section 7 reports the result of the 
welfare analysis. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  A brief review of literature 
Most of the literature on drug demand is based on the relationship between patient and 
physician, whose interaction influences the decision to prescribe and to take a certain 
medicine. Given the fact that the doctor acts as an imperfect, but interested agent of the 
patient, it is possible that the loyalty to a specific brand plays an important role, in other 
terms habits can often lead the physicians prescriptions or patients consumption (Stern 
and Trajtenberg, 1998). 
Biotechnological-pharmaceutical R&D process takes a lot of time and is very 
complicated, an important role on this being played by regulatory authorities (Berndt et 
al., 2005). Drug development costs are constantly increasing both in general terms 
(DiMasi et al., 1991, DiMasi et al., 2003) and by therapeutic category (DiMasi et al., 
2004). On the other hand pharmaceutical R&D productivity, often measured by the 
number of new products launched in the pharmaceutical markets, seems to decrease 
sensibly, varying from therapeutic category and being influenced by a long-term process 
of alliances, mergers and acquisitions (Danzon et al., 2004; Danzon et al., 2005). The 
sign and magnitude of this influence are however controversial. Scale, scope and 
spillover effects are other possible factors that can affect productivity (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996; Cockburn and Henderson, 2001). 
Productivity of the biotech drug sector has been investigated in the last years, 
showing different trends depending on several factors or differentiating by therapeutic 
area or drug type (Reichert and Paquette, 2003; Reichert and Pavlou, 2004). The 
diffusion of pharmaceutical innovation and the demand for pharmaceuticals can be 
influenced by consumption externalities, advertising and scientific information (Azoulay, 
2002; Battacharyya, 2005; Berndt et al., 2003). 
The simple count of the number of new drugs (i.e. products) launched does not 
seem to provide an adequate measure in order to evaluate the social impact of product   4
innovations. Trajtenberg (1990) proposes a model of evaluation of the changes on 
welfare subsequent to product innovation, and in addition to this he aims to investigate 
the role of patents as indicators of innovation in a certain field. Incremental patient 
welfare caused by a certain innovation can increase due to concurrent introduction of 
other innovations, changes in the prices or other observed characteristics, and because of 
market withdrawal of existing drugs (Cleanthous, 2002). Patients’ benefits arising from 
pharmaceutical innovation is also influenced by the problem of non-compliance with a 
specific therapy, and by the motives of physicians in their prescription behavior 
(Ellickson et al., 1999). All the references cited do not investigate the EPO market or any 
other biotechnological drug; hence the analysis of such markets can give further 
information on innovation and welfare in the pharmaceutical sector.  
 
3. Description of the products and the market 
Erythropoietins represent the biotechnological drugs class with the higher sales, about 10 
billion USD worldwide per year. The first EPO products were introduced about 15-20 
years ago. In the United States, the largest market worldwide, there was an initial 
monopoly of the product called Epogen (epoetin alfa) developed by Amgen, the world’s 
largest biotechnology company and launched in 1989, with the therapeutic indication of 
anemia in patients with renal failure. Despite its patents expiration (2004/2009), it still 
holds a large part of the market shares. In 1995 a new product came out, called Procrit, 
originated by Amgen, that gave an exclusive license to a Johnson&Johnson (J&J) 
subsidiary, with indication for anemia in non-dialysis patients (e.g.: chemotherapy-
induced anemia, therapeutic surgery). After the first monopoly phase, the market was 
characterized by market segmentation, in order to gain the highest profits. The reasons 
why Amgen decided to give a license to a potential competitor can be many: lack of 
productive capacity, better distribution and promotion network by J&J, or a strategic ex-
ante decision in order to disincentive a potential big competitor to invest in research and 
development of similar products
3. 
In 2002 Amgen launched Aranesp in the United States (darbepoetin alfa), a 
drastic product innovation, and a substitute of the existing products: it represented a 
strong technological advance because it showed longer half-life, needing less dosing 
(fewer injections than Epogen) and it is more powerful than epoetin alfa. It also allowed 
                                                 
3 Many interesting arguments about licensing and R&D are discussed by Tirole, 1991, par. 10.8.   5
Amgen access to new anemia market segments (including both pre-dialysis and oncology 
patients). The cost effectiveness ratio of darbepoetin alfa is better than that of epoetin alfa 
(Amgen, 2002). Amgen holds the worldwide exclusive rights to Aranesp, excluding 
Japan and China, where Kirin marketed the product under a license agreement. 
In markets outside US (especially Europe and Japan), the competition issues were 
slightly different: two products developed by two different firms were competing, and we 
did not observe a market segmentation. In 1988 Amgen launched its epoetin alfa product, 
sold under license by J&J and its subsidiaries under a variety of commercial names 
(Eprex, Erypo, Epopen, Epoxitin, Globuren, Espo…) whose therapeutic indication was 
the treatment of anemia. In sales analysis Eprex is often considerer equivalent to 
Epogen/Procrit; from a technological point of view they should be considered as different 
products, for they are manufactured by different companies in different facilities, using 
different methods and formulations. This could depend on different regulations to the 
drugs given by the main authorities (FDA in the US and EMEA in Europe). For the 
purposes of our analysis we could still consider them as the same product. 
In 1988 the non-US markets also saw the launch of another EPO product, called 
Recormon (epoetin beta), whose indication was the treatment of anemia in patients with 
chronic renal failure; it was developed by Genetics Institutes and marketed in EU by 
Boehringer Mannheim, sold in Japan by Chugai (under the name Epogin). It has then 
been marketed by Roche, that acquired those companies. The product failed to enter the 
US market, but a new formulation has then been filed in the US for other diseases 
(haematological malignances). Later the product changed name to NeoRecormon, due to 
some incremental innovations. Finally, Aranesp was launched in Europe in 2001, some 
months before the launch in the US, gaining high market shares. 
The existing products (in US and outside US) experienced a lot of relatively small 
incremental innovations mainly related to drug delivery, such as new formulations, 
longer time of action, different therapeutic indication broadening the uses of those drugs, 
etc… Those are typical strategies used by the big pharmaceutical companies in order to 
extend the patent protection over time. There are also signs that new big competitors are 
trying to enter the EPO market through the development of new products that will 
probably have a great impact on the EPO market in the next years
4.  
                                                 
4 The first potential entrant is represented by Dynepo (epoetin delta), the equivalent protein of 
Amgen’s erythropoietin, Epogen, which has been manufactured using Transkaryotic Therapies’ 
(TKT) gene activation technology. The product received FDA approval in September 2001 for the   6
There are many other important issues about the high level of competition in the 
EPO market. Competition is not only expressed by R&D, price and marketing strategies, 
but it is also realized through the engagement of legal disputes over license and patent 
rights (Crespi, 2005)
5. 
Another potential issue is the threat of biogenerics. In the US, with first patent 
expiration generic erythropoietin can be sold on the market. However a biogenerics 
competition is not to appear soon in the US market, due to a legal biogenerics approval to 
be established. Experts estimate that it will take about 5 years (from 2004) to have 
generic epoetin alfa on the US market (Dove, 2001). 
Recently in Europe EMEA, the European regulatory agency issued a document 
about “biosimilar” (a new biological medicinal product claimed to be “similar” to an 
original reference medicinal product which has been granted a marketing authorisation in 
                                                                                                                                                 
treatment of anemia in patients with chronic kidney failure, and it was approved in March 2002 by 
the European Commission but has not been launched due to an ongoing patent dispute with Amgen 
and Kirin regarding the infringement of Epogen’s patents. In 2001, the US District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts ruled that Dynepo infringed several patents associated with Amgen’s 
Epogen, while the High Court of Justice in the UK produced a similar ruling. Recently, the House 
of Lords in the UK agreed to hear Kirin-Amgen's petition for an appeal in a patent infringement suit 
involving Dynepo. The decision to hear both companies' appeals follows a unanimous opinion of 
non-infringement from the UK Court of Appeal in favor of Aventis/TKT. Furthermore, a patent 
appeal is pending in the US. 
Another candidate product is Roche’s second-generation epoetin R744, which is currently 
developed as a potential treatment of chemotherapy-induced anemia. This is an advanced form of 
currently marketed erythropoietins and – together with the recent purchase of Chugai’s 
erythropoietin business – shows the company’s firm intention to expand beyond NeoRecormon and 
form a strong franchise with the potential to challenge Amgen’s and Johnson & Johnson’s market 
shares in hematology and oncology. Roche plans to file for approval in 2006 and launch the product 
in 2007. However R744 is not expected to effectively compete with the established market leaders in 
the erythropoietins market (J&J’s Procrit and Amgen’s Epogen and Aranesp). This, and the launch 
of new generations of erythropoietins such as Aventis’s Dynepo, will sharpen the loss of market 
share of NeoRecormon in the long term.  
5 For example J&J tried to sell Procrit in US on the dialysis market, not included in the licence; in 
2002 an arbitrator ruled that J&J breached the licence agreement, but denied Amgen’s request to 
terminate the agreement. On the other hand J&J tried to demonstrate that Aranesp was only a new 
version of Epogen, claiming that they were entitled to rights over Aranesp for non-dialysis use as 
part of the licensing agreement covering Epogen. In 1998 Amgen won the dispute.   7
the Community), in which there are the guidelines concerning the scientific data to be 
provided to substantiate the claim of similarity used as the basis for a Marketing 
Authorisation Application (MAA) for any biological medicinal product, e.g.: medicinal 
products containing biotechnology-derived proteins as active substance, immunologicals 
such as vaccines, blood-derived products, monoclonal antibodies, etc (EMEA, 2004). 
Generics manufacturers are planning to market a generic version of epoetin alfa in 
Europe when EU patents will expire and there will be an approval process for biogeneric 
products, that is coming. Anyway it is difficult to produce biogenerics, because the 
production process is very complicated. In addition to legal and regulatory problems the 
biogenerics firms will thus face some technical problems. 
 
4.  The model 
4.1 Demand side 
In this study we present a formal model of demand and supply analysis, whose aims are 
to determine the factors that influence the choice of a drug in the EPO market, and to 
examine the changes in the choice induced by a product innovation in terms of social 
welfare.  
In this model (based on Berry, 1994, Berry and Pakes, 2002, Razzolini, 2004, and 
Train, 2002) we assume a consumer represented by a couple physician-patient i=1,2,…,I 
maximizing their utility deriving from the consumption of a product j=1,2,…,J in a 
certain time period. Actually, because EPO is mainly used in connection with serious 
cancer therapy, the decision makers, the consumers, will be medical doctors working in 
hospitals. Because a hospital is facing more strict budget constraint than a GP/ patient, for 
whom a substantial part of the expenses is reimbursed by the government, we would 
expect the demand to be rather elastic.  
Consumer utility is given by the following function: 
(1)  i j i jjj j UU ( , p , x , , ) =ε µ α           
where  εij  represents unobserved individual/drug characteristics (also called the taste 
shifter), pj is the drug price, xj and µj are product characteristics, and α is the vector of 
demand parameters to be estimated. Consumer i chooses product j if: 
(2)  ir r rrr ij j j j U( ,p,x , , ) max U( ,p ,x , , ); r ε ε µ α= µ α∀   
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A very simple version of the utility function is given by a linear function with an 
additive error term, independently distributed among consumers and product 
characteristics: 
(3)  i jjj jjjj i j j U( ,p,x , , ) V(p,x , , ) εµ α = µ α + ε        
Vj is the representative utility and it measures the mean utility level derived from the 
consumption of product j, and εij is the deviation from this mean level due to taste 
heterogeneity. In this model the only product attributes that are directly taken in 
consideration are price (pj) and time spent (xj) on the market for each drug. Using a fixed 
effect estimation procedure will capture other characteristics. 
By assuming εij to be independently, identically distributed extreme value (i.i.d. or 
type I extreme value) across individuals and products, the probability that consumer i will 
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  We observe that due to our assumption all consumers are observerable identical. 
The observed parallel to the probability that product j is chosen (eq. (4)) is the market 
share of the product. Because we only have access to aggregate data our observed 
variable will be the market share.  
If we consider the incumbent product that entered into the EPO market (i.e. 
Eprex) as the base product, here denoted product no 1, and if we assume there is no 
outside good whose utility can be normalized to zero, the estimated market shares for 
































          
where 
jt
µ  can differ across alternatives and time and Jt are the number of products 
available at time t.   9
Dividing  jt 1t by ϕϕ , we get 
(7)  jt
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β= α+ α ⋅ ,  j=1,…, Jt;          
(9)  jt jt j µ= µ+ α           
   
Ajt=xjt represents the time (in quarters) product j has been on the market. This 
variable should capture the habits of doctors and patients to choose the same product, 
irrespective of price. Thus it is considered as a measure of the brand loyalty: higher 
values of this variable lead to higher probability of that product to be chosen. Note that 
the highest value of Ajt/A1t is 1, e.g. the period when the first branded product became 
available. 
The parameter µjt is determined by two elements:  jt µ   is a random i.i.d. term 
(white noise with zero expectation and constant variance), while j α is a deterministic 
alternative specific coefficient, that represents attributes and aspects that remain constant 
over time.  
The demand equation that will be estimated is then     
(10) 
jt jt
01 t 1 1 t jj t j t j t
1t 1t
A






=α +α − +α − +µ
ϕ
 .       
 
4.2 Supply side 
The supply side analysis model is based on the following hypotheses: producers 
maximize their profits and prices are determined in a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. The 
expected profits is given by (A, p and α are vectors, and qj is amount sold, the index for 
time t is suppressed): 
 
(11)  jj j j j j j j (p,A, ,M) p M (A,p, ) C (q ) (p c )M (A,p, ) Πα = ϕα − = − ϕα ,    
where M is the market size, the quantity sold of a certain drug is  jj qM =ϕ , and we 
assume that marginal costs are linear and constant:  jj jj j Cc qc M = ⋅=⋅ϕ .   10
The first order condition for maximum of expected profit is given by:   















j jj j j j
j
1 p c; j 1 , 2 , , , J
(1 ) ( )(1 )
p
ϕ −ϕ
−= − = = = ∂ϕ βϕ −ϕ − β −ϕ
∂
   
  
As a measure of the market power of firm j in the Nordic markets for EPO, we 
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Because we expect βjt to be negative, the Lerner index is positive. From the 
definition of this index, equation (13), we observe that under perfect competition where 
prices equal marginal costs the Lerner index equals 0. At the other extreme- monopoly - 
the price is at highest relative to marginal costs and by convention we set the Lerner 
index equal to 1 under monopoly. Thus the Lerner index varies between 0 and 1, that is 
between the outcomes of perfect competition and monopoly. In between these two 
extremes we have market structures with market powers less than under monopoly. From 
the structure of the choice probability, ϕj, we easily get that the own-price elasticity, 







. We thus see that in order to have value of the Lerner index between 0 
and 1, the own-price elasticity has to be negative and numerically larger than 1. Actually, 
if the numerical value of the own-price elasticity is not larger than 1 at price optimum, 
then a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in prices, given our assumptions so far, does not exist.   11
  To model how the market power and market structure may evolve we will assume 
that the higher the max of the firm specific Lerner index is the higher is the chance is that 
new firms enter and presses down margin in all firms. This assumption seems to accord 
with what happened to the market after Aranesp entered the market. We will thus assume 
that the current index of market power, the Lerner index at time t, depends on the max 
Lerner index lagged one period, here specified as the following autoregressive stochastic 
process: 
(15)  jt j 1 r r,t 1 jt Lm a x [ L ] − =λ +λ +η .         
 Here  λj  are firm specific fixed effects while λ1 is coefficient that may or may not 
be less than 1; ηjt is assumed to be white noise. If the entry threat works and reduces the 
market power for the firms in the market, we will expect λ1 to be less than 1. If so the 
max of the expected Lerner index gradually will converge towards a level denoted Land 







                                                                         
where  1 ˆ and λλ  are the average of the estimated fixed effects and the estimate of λ1, 
respectively. 
 
5.  Data and summary statistics 
The dataset consists of market values (expressed in thousand euros) and quantity sold 
expressed in thousands defined daily doses (ddd) for each drug on the market included in 
the ATC codes related to EPO; data are available for each separate country (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden), and they cover a five years period from the second quarter of 
2000 to the first quarter of year 2005 included. During that period there are three products 
competing: Eprex, NeoRecormon and Aranesp; the latter is launched in Finland and 
Sweden in second quarter of 2001, and in Denmark and Norway in the third quarter of 
2001. 
Eprex is marketed by Johnson&Johnson, NeoRecormon by Roche and Aranesp by 
Amgen. Aranesp is a quite strong product innovation. Prices are expressed per ddd and 
deflated using national price indexes of each country, then converted into euro according 
the official exchange rates in each quarter. Market value is given by price multiplied by 
quantity sold.   12
The following figure shows the quantities sold expressed in thousands ddd’s in 
the four countries together. Note the reduction of sales of Eprex when Aranesp enters the 
market. 
 
The descending market power of Eprex is also clear in the next figure, that shows 
the market shares of each product. On the other hand NeoRecormon shares are quite 
constant over time. 
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The next figure shows the deflated prices. There is a clear tendency to a decrease 
over time for each product. Aranesp has the lowest price. 
 




Descriptive statistics for the sample used in our estimations are showed in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
INDUSTRY VARIABLES (Nobs=56) Mean Std. Err. Median Std. Dev. Min  Max
Market Value (€x1000)  6,848.84 430.15 7,088.15 3,218.93 82.18 11,565.79
X (DDDx1000)  641.59 39.82 693.15 298.01 8.30 1,077.40
P (deflated price)  10.61 0.10 10.54 0.73 9.35 12.27
Market shares  0.36 0.02 0.39 0.17 0.01 0.63
A (No. of quarters)   37.79 2.61 45.50 19.56 1.00 61.00
N (No. of firms)  2.86 0.05 3.00 0.35 2.00 3.00
NP (number of biotech drugs available) 35.52 0.71 38.00 5.34 27.00 43.00
PMAjt (Brand cumulated no. of post 
marketing authorizations) 
5.63 0.67 4.25 5.02 0.00 14.00
PMAt (Industry cumulated no. of post 
marketing authorizations) 
16.79 1.52 16.50 11.38 1.00 33.50
Q (quantity in dddx1000 of biotech 
drugs sold. excluding EPO) 
32,941.35 431.20 32,710.10 3,226.78 25,873.70 38,585.20
EPREX (Nobs=20)           
Market Value (€x1000)  7,205.18 680.38 8,637.93 3,042.74 2,567.18 11,317.40
X (DDDx1000)  640.46 57.22 713.20 255.88 245.00 1,011.20
P (deflated price)  11.12 0.14 10.97 0.61 10.39 12.27
Market shares  0.39 0.05 0.46 0.20 0.12 0.63
A (No. of quarters)   51.50 1.32 51.50 5.92 42.00 61.00
PMAjt   1.95 0.37 1.00 1.67 1.00 6.00
NEORECORMON (Nobs=20)           
Market Value (€x1000)  8,435.99 504.73 8,922.94 2,257.20 4,646.80 11,565.79
X (DDDx1000)  786.94 51.74 816.80 231.40 410.30 1,077.40
P (deflated price)  10.82 0.09 10.93 0.39 10.08 11.38
Market shares  0.43 0.01 0.43 0.05 0.37 0.50
A (No. of quarters)   47.50 1.32 47.50 5.92 38.00 57.00
PMAjt   7.75 1.16 8.25 5.21 0.00 13.50
ARANESP (Nobs=16)           
Market Value (€x1000)  4,419.47 790.09 4,640.70 3,160.38 82.18 8,390.20
X (DDDx1000)  461.31 83.68 481.80 334.72 8.30 893.90
P (deflated price)  9.73 0.06 9.73 0.25 9.35 10.21
Market shares  0.22 0.04 0.23 0.15 0.01 0.42
A (No. of quarters)   8.50 1.19 8.50 4.76 1.00 16.00
PMAjt   7.56 1.29 7.75 5.16 0.00 14.00
 
6.  Estimates  
6.1   Demand side 
First we deflated the nominal values in the 4 countries using national price indexes (2000 
Q2 = 100, sales are expressed in euro). Then we computed market shares, difference 
between prices and price-time and estimated the unknown coefficients in equation (10) 
above. Estimates are made with a fixed-effect regression.  
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Table 2. Estimates of the demand equation 
Coefficients Estimates Std. Err.  t-values.  
α0  -1.305316  0.3506637 -3.72 
α1  1.813934  0.1136616 15.96 
αi (average)  5.619583  0.3415373 16.45 
R-sq:   
 
within  = 0.8703 
between = 0.7902 
overall = 0.2220 
F test that all u_i=0: F(2, 43) =131.62    Prob > F = 0.0000 
No of observations: 48 
 
  All pharmaceuticals have side effects. These side effects are likely to be known by 
the medical doctor, in particular among those working in hospitals. The less negative 
these side effects of a certain drug are, the more likely it is that this drug will be chosen. 
The consumer will be willing to pay a higher price for drugs with less negative side 
effects. The producer knows this. Hence drug with less negative side effects may get a 
higher price in the market. As econometricians we do not have this knowledge and we do 
not observe the side effects either (qualitative effects of the drugs). To us these side 
effects may be present in the random terms in the demand equations. Due to the pricing 
strategy of the firm a correlation may arise between the price and the error term in the 
demand equations. Ignoring this correlation when estimating the model may yield bias 
estimates and we would expect that price responses are underestimated. What we 
wrongly get as weak price responses may be due to the fact that mor expensive drugs are 
just bought because of some unobserved drug characteristics. In order to account for  this 
possible endogeneity bias we have tried with instrumenting the price in the demand 
equation, using four instrumental variables (IV).  The ideal instruments should be 
correlated with the price but not with the unobserved qualities of the drugs. The 
specification of the instrumental variables and the complete results of the IV-estimation 
are reported in the Appendix; the next table shows the result of the fixed-effect regression 
using all four IV together. 
 
 
   16
Table 3. IV-Estimates of the demand equation 
Coefficients Estimates Std. Err.  t-values.  
α0  -2.606865  0.8078158 -3.23 
α1  2.014828  0.1790754 11.40 
αi (average)  5.83535  0.4093001 14.26 
R-sq:   
 
within  = 0.8727 
between = 0.7936 
overall = 0.2229 
F test that all u_i=0: F(2, 43) =99.41    Prob > F = 0.0000 
No of observations: 48 
 
  We observe that to instrument the prices matters lot with regard to the estimate of 
α0. As alluded to above the price responses are strengthened when prices are 












β= α+ α ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
    for j=2,3 (NeoRecormon, Aranesp) 
j 01 jt = β= β α+ α     for j=1 (Eprex). 
 
As noted above, the own-price elasticity is given by: 
(17)  jjt jt jt jt jt jt EE L: p p ( 1) ⎡⎤ =ϕ = β ⋅ ⋅ − ϕ ⎣⎦  for  j=1,2,3      
Cross-price elasticities are given by: 





   17
Table 4. Own-price elasticities and cross-price elasticities. 
   Own-price elasticity  Cross-price  elasticity 
t E11t  E22t  E33t  E21t  E31t  E32t  E12t  E13t  E23t 
2000 Q 2  -2.55  -5.44  -  5.90  -  -  2.35  -  - 
2000 Q 3  -2.65  -5.28  -  5.67  -  -  2.47  -  - 
2000 Q 4  -2.71  -5.03  -  5.37  -  -  2.54  -  - 
2001 Q 1  -2.76  -4.91  -  5.21  -  -  2.60  -  - 
2001 Q 2  -2.69  -4.88  -25.23  5.04  17.39  11.56  2.55  0.03  0.04 
2001 Q 3  -2.68  -5.00  -25.04  4.92  16.78  10.84  2.43  0.16  0.20 
2001 Q 4  -2.74  -5.12  -23.77  4.88  16.44  10.30  2.35  0.28  0.36 
2002 Q 1  -2.86  -4.98  -22.77  4.48  14.95  10.48  2.43  0.37  0.48 
2002 Q 2  -2.88  -5.09  -21.68  4.43  14.63  9.67  2.28  0.51  0.65 
2002 Q 3  -3.10  -4.81  -21.17  4.04  13.19  10.37  2.48  0.55  0.70 
2002 Q 4  -3.59  -4.35  -19.46  3.22  10.40  11.26  2.73  0.78  1.00 
2003 Q 1  -4.11  -3.84  -17.31  2.26  7.21  11.95  2.94  1.10  1.40 
2003 Q 2  -4.50  -3.88  -16.26  1.85  5.85  11.88  2.96  1.45  1.84 
2003 Q 3  -4.73  -3.80  -15.40  1.53  4.79  12.09  3.06  1.61  2.03 
2003 Q 4  -4.78  -3.90  -14.19  1.37  4.25  11.16  2.86  1.83  2.30 
2004 Q 1  -5.12  -3.83  -13.50  1.29  3.95  10.95  2.84  1.90  2.38 
2004 Q 2  -5.18  -3.92  -12.67  1.18  3.59  10.45  2.75  2.03  2.54 
2004 Q 3  -5.21  -3.93  -12.17  1.10  3.30  10.08  2.68  2.12  2.64 
2004 Q 4  -5.12  -3.94  -11.69  1.04  3.10  9.65  2.60  2.19  2.72 
2005 Q 1  -5.23  -3.80  -11.16  0.85  2.52  9.60  2.62  2.24  2.77 
average -3.76  -4.49  -17.72 3.28  8.90  10.77 2.63 1.20 1.50 
std dev  1.10  0.61  5.01  1.87  5.72  0.83  0.22  0.81  1.00 
min -5.23  -5.44  -25.23  0.85  2.52  9.60  2.28  0.03  0.04 
max -2.55  -3.80  -11.16  5.90  17.39  12.09  3.06  2.24  2.77 
1:Eprex, 2:NeoRecormon, 3: Aranesp 
Direct price elasticities are negative as expected and sizeable. The (negative) own- 
price sensibility of Eprex increases over time, while the other products show an opposite 
trend. These changes over time are in part driven by the changes in the market shares and 
prices and in part by the loyalty effect captured by the variable Ajt. Aranesp is the most 
more price-responsive drug. Cross elasticities are all positive and sizeable. The impact of 
the price of Eprex on the demand of the two other products declines over time, while the 
other cross elasticities are increasing over time. 
We observe that that all own-price elasticities are above 1 numerically, which is 
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6.2.  Supply side 
From the estimates of the demand side and from the formula for the Lerner index 






we computed the Lerner indices for the firms in each of the 
Nordic markets, i.e. for Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland. These indices are given in 
the figures below. Then we estimated equation (15) above separately for each of the 
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Table 5. Estimates of evolution of market power in the Nordic markets for EPO 
Coefficients Countries 
 Denmark  Finland 
  Estimates  Std err  t-values  Estimates Std err  t-values 
λ1  0.189531  0.1035  1.83  0.1964 0.1703  1.15 
λi (constant)  0.133928  0.041  3.26 0.14185  0.0653  2.17 
Long-run  0.1652  -  - 0.1765 -  - 
Coefficients Norway  Sweden 
  Estimates  Std err  t-values  Estimates Std err  t-values 
λ1  0.198512  0.0737  2.69 0.2236  0.0916  2.44 
λi (constant)  0.151812  0.0402  3.78 0.13404  0.0315  4.25 
Long-run  0.1894  -  - 0.1726 -  - 
  
   Results in bold are significant at a 5-10% confidence level. If we consider that the 
Lerner index reflects competition in the market, its calculated values seem to indicate that 
the Nordic market for EPO is rather competitive. The Lerner indexes in the long run in 
each country are similar, around 0.17-0.19; which imply that the market power in these 
markets are predicted to converge to values 17-19 percent above the perfect competitive 
outcomes. 
The Lerner index values when all countries are taken together lead to similar 
results, as we note in the graph and table below.   21
 
Table 6. Estimates of market power (all countries together) 
 Coefficients  All countries together 
   Estimates  Std err  t-values 
λ1  0.2453  0.1296  1.89 
λj (constant)  0.122  0.0408  2.98 
Long-run  0.1617  -  - 
 
  The estimate of the λ1 coefficient is higher than the coefficients estimated for the 
single countries, while the firm specific constant is slightly lower. The long-run index 
converges to a value of about 0.16 (quite the same we observed in each country). 
 
7.  Welfare analysis 
Using the results above we have measured the gains in social welfare arising from the 
product innovation, i.e. the entry of Aranesp, in EPO market. In order to calculate the 
expected surplus of the single consumer (here the representative consumer) we have 
employed the following formula (Trajtenberg, 1990): 
(19) 
t
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where:  0 σ=α -1/  is the coefficient related to price difference, Vjt is the deterministic part 
of the utility, and C is an unknown constant term that represents the fact that the absolute 
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level of utility cannot be measured. In what follows we have set C so that the E[CS] 
equals zero in the second quarter. 
In order to get the total consumer surplus we need to determine the number of 
consumers for every quarter. It has been computed as the ratio between the number of 
ddd’s sold in each quarter and the number of days of the quarter, thus obtaining the mean 
number of daily doses of the drugs sold every day, i.e. the mean number of patients 
(consumers) that take EPO every day. The total consumer surplus is simply given by the 
number of consumers times the expected consumer surplus for the representative 
consumer.  We then have computed the change in the total consumers’ surplus over time: 
1 t t ) CS ( E ) CS ( E ) CS ( E − − = ∆ . The results are given in Table 7 below.   
 
Table 7. Consumer surplus estimates. Euro 
Q Total  E(CS)  ∆E(CS) 
2000 Q 2  51,980  - 
2000 Q 3  0  -51,980 
2000 Q 4  121,254  121,254 
2001 Q 1  100,148  -21,106 
2001 Q 2  1,063,511  963,363 
2001 Q 3  906,742  -156,769 
2001 Q 4  1,002,229  95,487 
2002 Q 1  1,098,943  96,714 
2002 Q 2  1,232,139  133,196 
2002 Q 3  1,254,337  22,198 
2002 Q 4  1,517,437  263,100 
2003 Q 1  1,824,610  307,173 
2003 Q 2  1,647,418  -177,192 
2003 Q 3  1,665,660  18,242 
2003 Q 4  1,825,753  160,093 
2004 Q 1  1,775,407  -50,346 
2004 Q 2  1,879,688  104,281 
2004 Q 3  1,892,090  12,402 
2004 Q 4  2,004,967  112,877 
2005 Q 1  2,098,066  93,099 
 
From the moment the product innovation (Aranesp) enters the market (2001 Q 2) 
we observe a large increase in the consumer surplus: it becomes about 10 times greater 
then before. Then the surplus increases at lower rates (quite the same we observe during 
the quarters before the innovation) or slightly decreases; this probably means that the 
introduction of Aranesp is the only relevant factor in determining the surplus of the   23
consumers. The following graph shows the total consumer surplus in each quarter (bars) 
and its trend over time, represented by the polynomial curve (poli). 
 
 
We have also computed the expected producer surplus, i.e. the expected profit in 
price equilibrium, and its changes over time. Due to the assumption that costs are linear, 
we could determine the profit of every producer (index j) in every country (index k) 
during the period from the second quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2005:  
(20)  jkt jkt jkt jkt E(PS ) L p ddd =⋅ ⋅ .           
To obtain the total surplus of the producers we just nee to sum the figures by 
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Table 8. Producers surpluses and total surpluses 





2000 Q 2  4,256,591  -  4,308,571  - 
2000 Q 3  4,344,780  88,189  4,344,780  36,209 
2000 Q 4  4,248,672  -96,108  4,369,926  25,146 
2001 Q 1  4,600,664  351,992  4,700,812  330,886 
2001 Q 2  4,976,495  375,831  6,040,006  1,339,194 
2001 Q 3  5,151,252  174,756  6,057,994  17,987 
2001 Q 4  5,367,239  215,988  6,369,468  311,475 
2002 Q 1  4,962,969  -404,270  6,061,912  -307,556 
2002 Q 2  5,472,407  509,438  6,704,546  642,634 
2002 Q 3  5,143,010  -329,397  6,397,347  -307,199 
2002 Q 4  4,855,845  -287,165  6,373,282  -24,065 
2003 Q 1  4,414,753  -441,092  6,239,363  -133,919 
2003 Q 2  4,395,416  -19,338  6,042,834  -196,530 
2003 Q 3  4,407,890  12,474  6,073,550  30,716 
2003 Q 4  4,269,732  -138,158  6,095,485  21,935 
2004 Q 1  4,013,626  -256,105  5,789,033  -306,451 
2004 Q 2  3,987,988  -25,639  5,867,676  78,642 
2004 Q 3  3,871,679  -116,309  5,763,769  -103,907 
2004 Q 4  3,869,764  -1,915  5,874,731  110,962 
2005 Q 1  3,808,817  -60,947  5,906,883  32,152 
 
The following graph shows the variation of consumer, producer and total surplus over 
time, with their respective trends: 
   25
 
Aranesp enters the four markets in 2001 Q2 and Q3. The results show that there is 
a slight increase in producer surplus and the product innovation leads to the highest 
increase rates both in absolute and relative terms. The table shows also the sum of 
producer and consumer surplus and their variation over time. We observe an increase in 
this total surplus after the launch of Aranesp, but after some time has elapsed since the 
innovation we cannot see a clear trend of growth in total surplus. We can conclude that 
the introduction of the new product leads to considerably higher consumer welfare and 
brings more profits to the firms (but if we look at each firm we see that one of the 
incumbent looses market shares and profits, while others have gains) but the innovation 
does not seem to have a strong long term effect on the total surplus.  
 
 
8.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the demand and supply of erythropoietin in four 
Nordic countries. Our main aims have been to estimate demand for EPO and to determine 
the degree of competition in this Nordic market. We also have reported the impact of 
product innovation on welfare, e.g on consumer and producer surplus. The product 
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We find a positive effect on consumer surplus of the entry of Aranesp. Some time 
after the introduction of Aranesp, the total surplus, expected consumer surplus plus 
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APPENDIX – Estimates of the demand parameters with instrumental 
variables. 
 
To reduce endogeneity problems we instrument the price difference variable (pricediff) 
of the first demand equation: 
jt it
j0 j t 1 t 1 j t 1 t j t
1t 1t
A
l n ( p p) ( p p)
A
ϕ ⎛⎞
=α +α − +α − +µ ⎜⎟ ϕ ⎝⎠
 .        
 
We computed four instrumental variables: 
(1) NPt:    
the number of biotech products that are available in the Nordic pharmaceutical market at 
each time t: it can be considered a proxy of the impact of R&D in field of the 
biotechnologies for health;   
(2) PMAjt:    
the cumulated number of post-marketing authorizations obtained by each product, they 
measure the impact of incremental innovations and could express some unobservable 
quality characteristics of the EPO products
6; 
(3) PMAt:    
the cumulated number of post-marketing authorization for the whole EPO market, that is 
the sum of all brand authorizations in every quarter; 
(4) Qt:    
quantity (expressed in thousand ddd per quarter) sold of all biotechnological drugs in the 
market excluding EPO products. 
 
We have estimated the demand coefficients with all possible combinations of 
instrumental variables and related results are summarized in the following tables: 
 
 
                                                 
6 The post-marketing authorizations are derived from the official data from EMEA, that reports 
every change in each drug after its commercialization. According to the importance given by the 
European regulation authority, to major changes we assigned a weight equal to 1, and to minor 
changes equal to 0.5. Data for Eprex are derived from FDA files.   30
Instrumented variable: (pjt - p1t) 
Instrument(s) NPt PMAjt PMAt Q t 
Coefficients  Value  t stat.  Value  t stat. Value  stat.  Value   t stat 
α0  -9.99108 -0.96 -5.2815 -2.55 -5.4824 -2.09 -5.0562  -1.69 
α1  3.3351 1.78  2.5098 6.12  2.5449  5.09 2.4703  4.45 
αj (constant)  7.05986 3.24 6.2784 8.32 6.3117 7.68 6.2411  7.67 
 
Instrument(s) NPt; PMAjt NPt; PMAt PMAjt; PMAt NPt; Qt 
Coefficients  Value  t stat.  Value  t stat. Value  t stat. Value  t stat. 
α0  -4.04594 -2.90 -2.4821 -3.00 -5.2595 -2.55 -3.7529  -1.72 
α1  2.2936 8.03  2.0199  11.20 2.5059  6.15  2.2423 5.51 
αj (constant)  6.0737 10.61  5.8147  14.46 6.2748 8.35 6.0252  9.87 
 
Instrument(s) PMAjt; Qt PMAt; Qt PMAjt; PMAt; Qt NPt; PMAjt; PMAt 
Coefficients  Value  t stat.  Value   t stat. Value t  t stat.  Value  t stat. 
α0  -5.2813 -2.55  -5.4525 -2.09 -5.2407 -2.56  -2.7495 -3.23 
α1  2.5097  6.12 2.5397 5.12 2.5026 6.17 2.0668 11.06 
αj (constant)  6.2784  8.32 6.3067 7.72 6.2716 8.38 5.8589 13.89 
 
Instrument(s) NPt; PMAjt;Qt NPt; PMAt; Qt  NPt; PMAjt; PMAt; Qt 
Coefficients  Value  t  stat. Value t  stat.  Value t  stat. 
α0  -3.5939 -3.01  -2.3584 -2.99  -2.6069 -3.23 
α1  2.2145 8.90  1.9984  11.52 2.0418 11.40 
αj (constant)  5.9989  11.66 5.7942 14.76 5.8353 14.26 
 
 